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Abstract 
The advantages of policy and procedural expertise allow revolving door lobbyists to bypass the 
costs required of non-revolving door lobbyists. This professional upper hand gives advantages to 
the special interest groups that these revolvers represent. In a cross-sectional analysis and 
comparative case study of two American states, I find that a state without a mandatory waiting 
period for legislators yields a higher number of revolving door lobbyists than a state with a 
mandatory waiting period. The findings of this research suggest that lobbying laws are effective 











Democrats have been outspoken in their criticism of the Trump administration’s practice 
of appointing lobbyists to advanced and prestigious administrative posts. This practice becomes 
more ironic in light of one of the lynchpin promises of Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential 
election to “drain the swamp” of political elites and insiders in Washington, D.C. Special interest 
groups have become increasingly involved in the development of federal and state legislation, 
making the professional transitions of legislators increasingly significant. Legislators 
approaching the end of their term can choose to remain embroiled in the realm of politics or 
pursue other professional opportunities in their local communities. Many legislators choose to 
pursue opportunities to engage in legislative advocacy by accepting positions in the private 
sector. 
The ongoing involvement of individuals who have left office, including those voted out 
by their constituents, in the development of public policy raises issues of ethics, transparency, 
and symmetry in democratic processes. Data on the frequency of transitions between 
employment in the federal legislative sector and employment for a lobbying firm suggests the 
concept of a “revolving door” in American politics (Blanes Vidal et. al. 2012). The term 
“revolving door”, as it is used here, refers to the process that occurs as legislators transition into 
roles as lobbyists; this process is cyclical, meaning that lobbyists also pursue professional 
opportunities as legislators. The value of legislative expertise and connections makes revolving 
door lobbyists an asset to special interest groups. This process creates implications for 
policymaking at the federal and state levels. 
The interference of non-elected individuals in the process of policy development presents 
a threat to public trust in the legislative process. Relatedly, the continued involvement of former 
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legislators whose renewed service was not confirmed through electoral procedures potentially 
compromises the legitimacy of the policy making process. Scholars examining the revolving 
door have found that revolvers transplant their specialized legislative knowledge and connections 
into the private sector through lobbying (Lazarus et al 2016). 
Scholars are particularly concerned with the activity of revolving door lobbyists for 
several reasons. The expansion of interest group participation in the development of public 
policy has intensified competition for the time, attention, and loyalty of legislators at the federal 
and state levels (Baumgartner et al 1998). A recent investigation into the hiring practices of a 
large energy corporation in Illinois confirmed suspicions that this powerful corporation was 
recruiting former legislators with access to political capital in the form of political connections 
and specialized expertise (NPR 2019). These hiring practices are made possible by the absence 
of clear lobbying laws, and specifically one form of lobbying restriction- a mandatory waiting 
period. Lobbying laws are intended to create safeguards against corruption and increase the 
culture of political transparency. One of the most widely adopted forms of lobbying oversight are 
mandatory waiting period policies. Mandatory waiting periods constitute an attempt to insulate 
the legislative process from undue and outside influence. Ranging from six months to six years, 
these laws place restrictions on the types of professional opportunities that legislators can pursue 
following the completion of their terms (NCSL 2019). According to data from the National 
Conference of State Legislatures, 39 states currently have a mandatory waiting period 
prohibiting an immediate transition from legislation to legislative advocacy while 11states do not 
have a mandatory waiting period by statute (NCSL 2019). 
The following thesis seeks to establish the relationship between mandatory waiting 
periods and the volume of revolving door lobbyists in Illinois and Wisconsin. This thesis 
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includes an overview of the existing literature on the features and consequences of the revolving 
door. I have also provided an outline of the features of the research design that I used to assess 
the impact of one form of restrictive policy on the process of the revolving door in two American 
states. I have conducted a comparative case study measuring the impact of the mandatory 
waiting period in two states. By picking two states with similarities in relevant political 
characteristics, I have identified that states with a mandatory waiting period in place have less 
revolving door lobbyists than states without this law. I have identified the methods used to reach 
these results. This thesis also includes a discussion of my findings and opportunities for future 
research on this topic. 
Literature Review 
The following literature review includes scholarly commentary on the normative 
implications of the revolving door as a political process (Gilens & Page 2014; Lapira & Thomas 
2017). Scholars have identified the skills and strategies specific to revolving door lobbyists that 
give them a professional upper hand (e.g. Cain & Drutman 2013; Bumgartner et al 1998). There 
is developing literature on the phenomenon of the revolving door at the state level (Strickland 
2020 A; 2020 B). From this literature, I have identified a gap and corresponding research 
question and hypothesis. 
One area of focus within the body of literature on the revolving door are the ramifications 
of the revolving door for democratic access and equitable representation. Critics of the revolving 
door maintain that the consistent and saturated presence of lobbyists can inhibit the access of 
constituents to their legislators (Gilens & Page 2014). Some scholars raise objections to the 
higher compensation commanded by revolving door lobbyists. Special interest groups that 
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cannot offer competitive compensation packages are less likely to be able to recruit talented 
revolving door lobbyists. A study by Gilens & Page in 2014 can be used to demonstrate that 
business interests maintain an advantage at the expense of constituent advocacy groups. At the 
aggregate level, special interest groups and lobbyists represent business entities more frequently 
than civic organizations (Lapira & Thomas 2017). Data from the federal level suggests that 
revolving door lobbyists represent a greater number of clients and retain these clients at a higher 
rate than their colleagues who do not have government experience (Lapira & Thomas 2017). 
These trends suggest that corporations with greater resources that can employ revolving door 
lobbyists can acquire a greater level of political capital than smaller special interest groups. How 
democratic is our legislative process if it only represents the interests of individuals with 
legislative experience? 
A second focus of the literature on the revolving door is the strategies employed by 
revolving door lobbyists that distinguish them from other lobbyists. The strategies employed by 
lobbyists have captured the interest of scholars; consequently, the literature on the revolving door 
at the federal level largely consists of a discussion of these strategies. There are certain costs 
associated with the practice of lobbying, which create substantial hurdles. One major hurdle for 
lobbyists and interest groups is the communication of the relevance of their policy issue 
(Baumgartner et al 1998). The value of lobbyists in the process of policy development derives 
from their ability to mobilize financial resources and legislative information. Financial 
contributions and legislative specialization can strengthen the relationship between legislators 
and lobbyists. The ability of lobbyists to direct the allocation of financial resources makes them 
particularly powerful in the special interest group landscape. These donations to political action 
committees yield legislative results, measured by congressional roll call votes (Baumgartner et al 
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1998).The desire of lobbyists to obtain the loyalty and commitment of legislators motivates their 
willingness to pursue a variety of strategies to develop their relationship with legislators. 
Additional characteristics of lobbyists shape the nature of relationships between lobbyists 
and legislators. The extent of lobbyists’ network and access to resources on policy issues 
increase the likelihood of their success in lobbying for particular interests. Scholars attribute the 
advantages experienced by revolving door lobbyists to their professional connections, knowledge 
and familiarity with public policy, and intimate understanding of the legislative process (Cain & 
Drutman 2013). 
  Within the body of existing literature on the revolving door, scholars identify and analyze 
features of transitions to the private sector at the federal level (Blanes Vidal et al 2012, Gilens & 
Page 2014, Cain & Drutman 2013). Scholars have underscored the tactics employed by federal 
and state lobbyists to advance the agendas of special interest groups (i.e. tapping into existing 
professional connections) (Baumgartner et al 1998, Cain & Drutman 2013). Literature on the 
revolving door underscores the advantages and professional upper hand experienced by lobbyists 
with legislative experience (Bertrand et al 2014, Berkman 2001, Strickland 2020A, Strickland 
2020B).  
The expertise and familiarity with which lobbyists and interest groups approach the 
development of legislation contributes to their value in the political process. Scholars differ in 
their perception of how frequently legislators rely on lobbyists for expertise on policy 
development. Information on forthcoming legislation is subject to the scrutiny of lobbyists and 
interest groups. Lobbyists with legislative experience often have greater and deeper familiarity 
with complex pieces of state and federal legislation (Bertrand et al 2014). The practice of 
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lobbyist messaging requires that lobbyists are particularly knowledgeable about the piece of 
legislation for which they are advocating (Heberlig 2005). The length of a given legislator’s 
tenure contributes to the extent of their policy expertise (Ozymy 2010). The strength and 
eloquence with which lobbyists present a particular legislative initiative determines the trajectory 
of a particular concern within the legislative agenda. While lobbyists may acquire knowledge of 
a legislator’s preference over the course of their tenure, the practice of lobbying remains a 
calculated risk. This association suggests that lobbyists with legislative experience could bolster 
their presentation with the additional information and tactics that they acquired through 
professional experience in the legislative sphere. 
Scholars have distinguished between lobbyists who provide clients with valuable 
consultation on political strategy and lobbyists who specialize in providing expertise on pieces of 
legislation (Lapira & Thomas 2017). Revolving door lobbyists’ political experiences makes them 
qualified to consult on both the technical language inherent in legislation and the strategy 
required to introduce and advance policies on behalf of special interest groups. 
Revolving door lobbyists are uniquely positioned to experience success in their personal 
relationships because their legislative experience affords them knowledge of campaign strategies 
and policy expertise. Consequently, revolving door lobbyists can sidestep some of the steps 
required to propel the agendas of special interest groups through the legislative process.  
Scholars have concluded that revolving door lobbyists can wield their political strength and 
experience in particularly competitive and crowded interest group environments (Berkman 
2001). 
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Within the body of literature on revolving door lobbying, scholars are particularly 
concerned with the tactics employed by lobbyists to advance policies favoring particular special 
interests. The application of interpersonal tactics characterizes the behavior of individual 
lobbyists. Interest groups tend to develop strategies based on their acquisition of revolving door 
lobbyists while revolving door lobbyists leverage tactics. Personal meetings continue to be the 
most frequent vehicle through which lobbyists interact with legislators (Nownes & DeAlejandro 
2009, Baumgartner et al 1998). Scholars insist that, of the advantages experienced by revolving 
door lobbyists, personal connections remain the most valuable link in relationships between 
lobbyists and legislators.  Personal meetings provide lobbyists with the most direct vehicle for 
advocacy (Nownes & DeAlejandro 2009, Baumgartner et al 1998). Logic suggests that revolving 
door lobbyists who maintain connections to practicing legislators would have an upper hand over 
their colleagues with limited professional networks. These revolving door lobbyists would be 
more likely to leverage their political connections to schedule personal meetings with current 
legislators. Their personal connections are contingent on the ongoing service of their legislative 
colleagues. These personal connections create political leverage, making former legislators 
particularly valuable capital for lobbying firms. 
Studies conducted on the dynamic relationship between lobbyists and legislators 
demonstrate the parallels in personal and professional recruitment experienced by lobbyists and 
legislators (Zeigler & Baer 1968). Similar professional experiences create solidarity and 
strengthen personal relationships between lobbyists and legislators. 
The common objective of reelection drives legislators to prioritize consistent support 
from voters on legislative decisions (Denzau & Munger 1986). The commitment of legislators to 
maintaining voter support restricts the introduction and discussion of potential legislative 
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initiatives within conversations between legislators and lobbyists. Lobbyists are limited by the 
reelection objectives of legislators; they are unlikely to present initiatives that interfere with a 
legislator’s ability to acquire voter support for successive terms in office. The ability to pursue 
pieces of legislation without concern for constituent feedback can be an attractive incentive for 
legislators to transition into the private sector. 
In his examination of the composition of state legislatures, Todd Maske discovered that 
specialization and expertise play a significant role in the successful development and evolution 
of legislation (Maske 2019). Specialization and expertise are particularly valuable in the context 
of legislative committees. Lobbyists with experience on specific legislative committees have 
tools to effectively introduce and advocate a legislative agenda in their meetings with members 
of that committee. The literature evaluating the extent of the revolving door at the federal level 
has identified several significant strategies. Scholars have observed similar trends at the state 
level, with significant discrepancies in the extent to which revolving door activity is regulated.  
Continuity and Change: Variation in Lobbying Regulation across US States 
The literature on the revolving door is largely focused on Congressional transitions to 
large scale lobbying firms in Washington, DC. The dynamic between lobbyists and legislators at 
the state level mirrors the dynamic between lobbyists and legislators at the federal level. 
Established groups with extensive resources experience an advantage over smaller, grassroots 
organizations (Browne 1985). My work builds on James Strickland’s recent research (2020 A, 
2020 B) on the impact of lobbying regulations on special interest group activity. Strickland 
identified and evaluated trends in the number of revolving door lobbyists in American states 
across a period of about 30 years. 
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The work of some scholars in the body of literature on the revolving door addresses the 
dynamic between legislators and lobbyists in state legislatures. The literature on the revolving 
door at the state level delineates the variation across lobbying regulations (Brinig 1993, 
Strickland 2020A). Specifically, there is variation in the existence and implementation of 
mandatory waiting periods for legislators attempting to transition into the private sector upon 
completing their legislative term (NCSL 2019). This variation potentially creates windows for 
special interest groups to exploit. Over the past thirty years, all fifty states have experienced an 
increase in the number of lobbyists employed by special interest groups (Strickland 2020A). The 
stringency and extent of lobbying regulation varies significantly across the fifty states (Brinig 
1993). The basic standard of regulation consists of a registration requirement and a threshold for 
financial transparency (Ozymy 2013). Within the scope of lobbying regulations, states differ in 
their classification of lobbying and the limitations that they place on lobbyist activity outside of 
the legislature. States also differ on disclosure requirements for lobbyists. 
Scholars have hypothesized that as regulations increase, the likelihood of favorable 
legislative outcomes for lobbyists decreases (Brinig 1993). One common lobbying regulation is a 
mandatory waiting period, sometimes referred to as a cooling off period, requiring legislators to 
wait for a set number of months prior to accepting a position with a lobbying firm and registering 
as a lobbyist. Scholars underscore that regulations increase the cost of lobbying. Data from 
studies on state-level lobbying regulation suggests that the stringency and extent of lobbying 
regulations can deter the registration of lobbyists and interest groups (Gray & Lowery 1998). 
The body of literature on the revolving door largely consists of analysis on the 
recruitment and acquisition of former legislators by interest groups. Research on the revolving 
door at the federal level indicates that lobbyists with legislative experience are particularly 
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attractive to lobbying firms. Legislators’ professional connections and expertise on policy and 
procedure make them particularly attractive candidates for recruitment to lobbying firms. 
Evidence collected from previous studies confirms the existence of a relationship between 
regulations on interest group representatives and the extent of interest group influence in state 
legislatures (Ozymy 2010). The implementation of mandatory waiting periods as a response to 
the growing influence of the revolving door creates consequences for the development and 
outcomes of public policy. Lobbyists with legislative experience solicit higher rates of 
compensation at the federal and state levels. Mandatory waiting periods constitute a barrier to a 
direct transition from legislation to lobbying in the private sector. I hypothesize that the existence 
of a mandatory waiting period will reduce the number of revolving door lobbyists in a state. 
Relatedly, I hypothesize that the absence of a mandatory waiting period will yield a greater 
number of revolving door lobbyists in a state.  
Methods 
To analyze the impact of mandatory waiting periods on the volume of revolving door 
lobbyists, I will be implementing John Stuart Mill’s method of comparison. I will be 
implementing Mill’s method of difference, a process through which I will identify two states that 
share similar characteristics among most of the theoretically-relevant explanations but differ in 
my primary area of examination.  If these two states have different levels of revolving door 
lobbyists, I can attribute this to the one policy characteristic where these states differ. 
To measure my primary independent variable, I rely upon the National Conference of 
State Legislature’s data on revolving door prohibitions in each of the fifty states to determine 
which states currently enforce a mandatory waiting period prohibiting legislators from pursuing a 
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position with a lobbying firm within a defined number of months following the end of their term. 
I will not be assessing the stringency of mandatory waiting periods, but rather the existence of a 
mandatory waiting period. So I need two states- one with a mandatory waiting period and one 
without this statute in place. To ensure that the mandatory waiting period is driving changes in 
the number of revolving door lobbyists, I need to exclude the possibility of other variables 
shaping these results. 
To ensure that it is the presence of a mandatory waiting period that shapes the number of 
revolving door lobbyists, I also need to identify several other variables that might account for the 
variation in volume of legislators transitioning into the private sector. Moreover, I need to ensure 
that the two states have similar characteristics on these variables to ensure that differences in 
mandatory waiting periods account for differences in the number of revolving door lobbyists. 
The first variable I considered is the existence of legislative term limits. Literature on term limits 
in state legislatures suggests that these limits shape the strength and efficiency of policy making. 
The absence of term limits allows legislators to continue to acquire expertise of legislation and 
familiarity with legislative procedure (Ozymy 2010). In their survey of lobbyists, Gary Moncrief 
and Joel Thompson (2001) observed that most lobbyists perceive term limits as a catalyst for 
changing the structure of policy making for both the executive and legislative branches 
(Moncrief & Thompson 2001). Term limits accelerate the process of legislative turnover which 
can result in a political climate that is rapidly changing in its partisan orientation. Term limits 
also impact the likelihood that legislators will pursue different legislative offices (Lazarus 2006). 
Term limits could catalyze legislators’ transition into the private sector. Therefore, I hypothesize 
that states with term limits will have greater numbers of revolving door lobbyists while states 
without term limits will have lesser numbers of revolving door lobbyists. 
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A second variable that I analyzed is the existence of campaign contribution limits.  
Campaign contributions constitute an important form of special interest group participation in 
state politics. Financial contributions can enhance or reinforce lobbying efforts. Campaign 
contributions are often contingent on a legislator’s commitment to a particular legislative 
outcome (Powell 2012). The implementation of contribution limits on state legislative campaigns 
constitute one form of addressing the influence of prominent donors on the legislative process. 
Some scholars suggest that it is difficult to establish a direct correlation between campaign 
contributions and political outcomes. Studying these contributions in tandem with an analysis of 
lobbying efforts can more fully contextualize and explain legislative outcomes. What matters 
here is that there are contribution limits-the literature has identified that campaign contributions 
play a role in shaping outcomes, so I took this variable into consideration when selecting my 
states, but I will be looking at whether or not a contribution limit exists- the size of the limit is 
not relevant to the findings of this study . 
Recent literature underscores the relationship between state policies on campaign 
financing and the culture of lobbying and interest groups. Campaign contribution regulations 
tend to be more stringent than regulations of lobbying practices (Briffault 2008). James 
Strickland observed that campaign finance regulations adversely impact the registration of 
lobbyists (Strickland 2019b). I hypothesize that the existence of campaign contribution limits 
could deter the registration of lobbyists, thereby decreasing the total number of registered 
lobbyists in a given state. This would consequently reduce the number of revolving door 
lobbyists by extension.  
A third variable that I researched is the size of a state’s legislature. I hypothesize that a 
larger state legislature would produce a higher number of registered lobbyists. The logic here 
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interest groups will need to employ more lobbyists to meet the needs of more legislators. A state 
legislature with a greater number of legislators will produce a larger pool of individuals who 
might be interested in transitioning into positions in the private sector. Data on state legislative 
trends suggests that as the size of state legislatures increases, they become more 
professionalized. (Malhotra 2006). 
An additional variable that I will include in my consideration of states for analysis is the 
professionalism of state legislatures. The term “professionalism” in this context encompasses the 
extent of professional resources available to state legislators. The term also refers to the 
seriousness and expertise with which political actors approach the state legislative process 
(Mooney 1995). Within the body of literature on state legislatures, scholars underscore the 
growing trend of professionalization across state legislatures (Mooney 1995). Professional 
legislatures tend to consist of legislators with specialized knowledge and expertise.  The process 
of professionalization encourages legislators to match their expertise to the growing demands of 
the public sector (Malhotra 2006). I anticipate that the characteristics of professional legislatures 
produce several dynamics. Some scholars maintain that the professionalization of legislatures has 
lengthened the career terms of legislators, potentially curbing transitions into the private sector 
(Woods & Baranowski 2006). The demand for specialization and expertise in the lobbying 
industry suggests that professional legislators would be highly valuable capital for lobbying 
firms. Some scholars observe that the professionalization of legislatures complicates interest 
group influence (Berkman 2001). Legislators become increasingly knowledgeable of policy 
developments in professional legislatures and typically build stronger connections with their 
constituents (Berkman 2001). The systematic and streamlined characteristics of professional 
legislatures make legislators less reliant on outside information (Berkman 2001). Because there 
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is a demand from lobbying firms for specialized legislative expertise, I predict that professional 
legislatures will produce more revolving door lobbyists. 
There is a natural relationship between the professionalization of a state legislature and 
compensation for legislators (Fiorina 1999). I anticipate that legislatures with higher salaries 
could yield fewer revolving door lobbyists than state legislatures with lower salaries. 
Compensation shapes the likelihood that legislators will accept non-monetary benefits from 
lobbyists (Ozymy 2010). 
Using Mill’s method, I compared a number of variables across all fifty states. I 
determined that Illinois and Wisconsin are most compatible in several areas of political activity. 
As demonstrated in Table A, neither Illinois nor Wisconsin has legislative term limits. In both 
states, Senators serve in four-year terms while representatives serve in two-year terms. Both 
states place limits on contributions to legislative campaigns. Illinois and Wisconsin have 
comparably sized legislative chambers. Both the Illinois legislature and the Wisconsin legislature 
are full-time, professional legislatures. The salaries for legislators in Illinois and Wisconsin are 
relatively similar. Significantly, Illinois and Wisconsin differ on the policy of mandatory waiting 
periods for legislators attempting to enter the private sector. Wisconsin has a twelve-month 
mandatory waiting period for legislators transitioning into the private sector while Illinois does 
not have a mandatory waiting period (NCSL 2019). I have accounted for other variables that 
could explain the variation in volume of revolving door lobbyists, allowing me to trace the 
discrepancies to the differing policies on waiting periods. 
For the purposes of this research, I identified the number of revolving door lobbyists as 
my dependent variable. Measuring the number of registered lobbyists with legislative experience 
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(“revolvers”) in Illinois and Wisconsin provides a quantitative indication of the extent to which 
former legislators are serving as lobbyists in their respective states. I recognize that there may be 
former legislators working for special interest groups in an unofficial capacity. This thesis does 
not attempt to capture the entirety of former legislators’ involvement with special interest groups 
but rather seeks to identify the relationship between one particular policy by statute and the 
volume of revolving door lobbyists. 
To measure the impact of mandatory waiting periods on the lobbyist population, I 
conducted a cross sectional study of lobbyists registered in Illinois and Wisconsin in 2017. I used 
lobbyist databases to create two lists of registered lobbyists in Illinois and Wisconsin using data 
from the National Institute on Money in Politics, an organization that compiles data on a variety 
of political practices, including relationships between lobbyists and clients. I used data from the 
Wisconsin Elections Commission and Illinois State Board of Elections compiled to compile lists 
of data on biennial election results in both Illinois and Wisconsin for the years 1998-2014. The 
literature on the revolving door motivated my selection of data for these years. Scholars suggest 
that revolving door lobbyists employ their most salient political connections formed with 
contemporary legislative colleagues as they advocate for special interest groups (Bertrand et al 
2014, Ainsworth 1997). 
 I compared the list of registered lobbyists to the election results in both Illinois and 
Wisconsin to determine the number of registered lobbyists with legislative experience. For each 
state, I compiled a list of the lobbyists with legislative experience and subsequently calculated 
the number of revolving door lobbyists as a proportion of the overall number of lobbyists. I only 
considered individual entries and sorted the registered lobbyist lists by lobbyists and lobbying 
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firms. I looked at each entry on the list of registered lobbyists from 2017 to determine whether 
there was a match with the legislator data from 1998-2014. 
In summary, using a comparative case study- I have selected Illinois and Wisconsin- two 
states that differ in the presence of mandatory waiting periods but that display similarities on all 
other theoretically relevant variables. I anticipate that the absence of a mandatory waiting period 
will result in more revolving door lobbyists in Illinois than in Wisconsin.  
Discussion of Results 
From the data I examined, I determined that in the state of Illinois there were 41 former 
legislators registered to lobby in 2017. I determined that in the state of Wisconsin there were 13 
former legislators registered to lobby in 2017. Of the 377 legislators who served in the Illinois 
state legislature between 1998 and 2014, 10.6% transitioned into positions as lobbyists. Of the 
281 legislators who served in the Wisconsin state legislature between 1998 and 2014, 4.6% 
transitioned into positions as lobbyists. This data reveals a significant discrepancy in the volume 
of revolving door lobbyists in a state with a statute restricting transitions to lobbying and a state 
without such a statute. 
The chamber breakdown of the revolving door lobbyists signals important trends in the 
nature of the revolving door. 31 of the 41 (76%) revolving door lobbyists served in the Illinois 
House of Representatives while 10 (24%) of the revolving door lobbyists served in the Illinois 
Senate. 10 of the 13 (77%) revolvers served in the Wisconsin House of Representatives with 3 of 
the 13 (23%) revolvers serving in the Wisconsin Senate. This data is consistent with the 
respective sizes of the House of Representatives and Senate in each state. There are more 
members in the Illinois and Wisconsin Houses of Representatives than in the Senates. 
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Furthermore, the length of the term in the House of Representatives is two years while the length 
of the term in the Senate is four years. The volume of legislators serving in the House of 
Representatives, coupled with the length of the term in the House explains the greater number of 
revolvers transitioning out of the House of Representatives. 
Using 2017 data, 26 of the 41 (63%) registered lobbyists with legislative experience in 
Illinois were Democrats while 15 of the 41 (37%) lobbyists with legislative experience were 
Republicans (See Figure A). The partisan composition of the population of revolving door 
lobbyists looked quite different in Wisconsin. 2 of the 13 (15%) registered lobbyists with 
legislative experience in Wisconsin were Democrats while 11 of the 13 (85%) lobbyists with 
legislative experience were Republican. The partisan breakdown of these groups of revolvers 
likely reflects the partisan landscapes of Illinois and Wisconsin. Recent electoral results suggest 
that Wisconsin is a Republican state while Illinois is a Democratic state. These results signal that 
being a former member of the majority party in the state legislature increases the likelihood of 
transitioning to the private sector. The literature on the revolving door maintains that these 
revolvers have intimate knowledge of the types of legislation that will pass through the 
respective state legislatures.  
Some anecdotal examples of political actions taken by revolving door lobbyists help 
demonstrate the consequences of revolving door transitions in Illinois. Not all revolvers are 
pushing for the agendas of a select group of corporations. For example, John Bradley, a former 
Democratic member of the Illinois House of Representatives, lobbies on behalf of a Chicago 
Theater group. Relevant to the purposes of this research, however, is the fact that Bradley 
registered to lobby the day after the swearing in of his successor. Some other former legislators 
leverage their expertise and relationships to benefit larger corporations. 
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The following examples relate to one corporation in Illinois that has been particularly 
successful in recruiting legislators to serve as lobbyists. Denny Jacobs held a seat in the Illinois 
Senate until his son Mike took over the seat. Denny began a career as a lobbyist shortly after 
exiting public office; one of his clients was Commonwealth Edison, or ComEd, the largest 
electric company in Illinois (Timmons 2015).  During his time in office, Mike served on the 
Illinois Senate’s energy committee creating a point of intersection between his legislative service 
and his father’s lobbying career (Timmons 2015). 
Additional evidence suggests that recruiting legislators with familiarity with relevant 
committees and key legislators is important for utility companies like ComEd. ComEd 
successfully recruited Anazzette Collins, former chair of the House Public Utilities Committee. 
Collins’ familiarity with developing energy legislation coupled with her connections to 
individuals serving on the Utilities Committee and related committees likely made her an 
attractive candidate for a lobbying position with ComEd.  
Dave Sullivan, a former Republican Senator accepted a lobbying position at the end of 
his time in office and his clients include large corporations like AT & T and AbbVie. Given the 
evidence in the literature on the use of compensation as a recruiting tool, large corporations with 
greater access are able to pay legislators for their expertise and relationships. The preceding 
examples confirm the fears of scholars who have cautioned against the saturation of interest 
group lobbyists with legislative and procedural expertise.  
Between 1989 and 2011, the number of revolving door lobbyists in Illinois increased 
from 32 to 38. Within that same span of twenty-two years, the number of revolving door 
lobbyists in Wisconsin decreased from 18 to 11 (Strickland 2020B). These trends are consistent 
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with my findings that the absence of a mandatory waiting period increases a state’s volume of 
revolving door lobbyists. Relatedly, this research suggests that the use of a mandatory waiting 
period serves as an effective deterrent of an immediate transition from legislation to lobbying. 
The decreased number of revolving door lobbyists in a state like Wisconsin with a policy directly 
addressing the influence of lobbyists with legislative experience indicates that this policy 
contributes to the political culture surrounding the revolving door. The quantitative data and 
anecdotal examples suggest that interest groups in Illinois are incorporating former legislators 
into the fold of lobbying and advocacy. Large corporations are able to employ several former 
legislators at a time, giving them a substantial resource advantage over smaller interest groups.  
If given the opportunity to research this topic further in the future, I would be interested 
in coding the stringency of mandatory waiting periods to determine whether longer and more 
restrictive mandatory waiting periods decrease the number of revolving door lobbyists in a given 
state. I would like to expand this research to include more states. In doing so, I could generalize 
these findings and further measure the effectiveness of mandatory waiting periods. I anticipate 
that effective policies developing at the state level could inform the development of additional 
policies related to the revolving door at the federal level. The issue of “shadow interests” in local 
and national interests is growing in relevance in the sphere of political science literature and I 






Tables & Figures 
Table A: Legislature Characteristics, Illinois and Wisconsin 
Variable Illinois Wisconsin 
Legislative Term Limits No No 
Term Length Senate: 4 years, Assembly: 2 
years 






Legislature Size 59 Senate, 118 House 33 Senate, 99 Assembly 
Legislative 
Professionalism 
Professional Legislature Professional Legislature 
Full-Time/Part-Time 
Legislature 
Full-Time              Full-Time 
Salary $67,836/year $50,950/year 
Mandatory Waiting Period 
by Statute 
No Yes 






























Figure C: Wisconsin: 
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